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The Cabinet Manual is constitutionally problematic because it
expresses only the Executive’s views
In 2010, the then-Government published the Cabinet Manual, which was at the time seen as a first step towards
the formal codification of the British constitution. While its introduction is likely to have a significant impact on the
influence of convention in Government, the domination of the production of the manual and a number of similar
documents by the UK executive is constitutionally problematic, argues Andrew Blick. 
Conventions – defined here as rules that are not legally enacted – are important to any constitution. But they
seem to have exceptional prominence within the ‘unwritten’ arrangements of the UK. Some of the principles most
fundamental to our democracy exist in this potentially nebulous form. They include the understandings that if a
party wins an outright majority in the House of Commons its leader becomes Prime Minister; that senior ministers
take major decisions collectively in Cabinet; that they are responsible individually to Parliament for the exercise of
their particular powers; and that the monarch should avoid involvement in party political controversy. Any change
in the nature of conventions, therefore, matters. It is taking place presently.
In recent years, a practice has developed for the publication of official texts setting out operational rules and
principles of government, including conventions, which often previously existed only in a more vague, unwritten
state. For instance, the Armstrong Memorandum appeared in 1985, defining the core values of the Civil Service
(subsequently supplemented by the Civil Service Code). Questions of Procedure for Ministers (since 1997 known
as the Ministerial Code), comprising guidance on procedure and propriety for ministers, became public in 1992.
Following the introduction of devolution from the late 1990s, concordats have appeared dealing with the format of
relations between the centre and the devolved administrations. An important instalment in this codification
process came with the Cabinet Manual.
Impetus for the production of the manual came from three sources. The first was the desire of Gordon Brown,
when Prime Minister, to instigate a process that might lead to a full written constitution for the UK. What became
the manual was intended to set out the details of the present system for discussion purposes. The second motive
was a judgement formed within Whitehall during 2009 that the next General Election might not yield an outright
single party victor. To this end a draft of the section from the manual dealing with how governments should form in
this eventuality was published early, in advance of the poll of May 2010. It helped inform insiders and the public of
the principles that would guide the construction of a government. A third inspiration for the manual was a desire to
imitate a UK version of the New Zealand Cabinet Manual, a text in existence in various editions since 1979. The
New Zealand text sets out some of the key features of one of the few constitutions other than that of the UK that is
unwritten. While Brown initiated the manual, the project continued under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
coalition formed under David Cameron in May 2010, which issued the document later the following year. The
stated intention of the government is periodically to issue revised versions of the manual, presumably in each
Parliament.
The manual describes itself as a ‘guide to the laws, conventions and rules on the operation of government’. It
provides accounts of a number of arrangements it is reasonable to regard as conventions, and which have never
previously been encapsulated in such a formal fashion. The text contains descriptions of the proper constitutional
position of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, and the monarch; the relationship between Parliament and the
government; between devolved and central government; and many other matters. In my recent Parliamentary
Affairs article, ‘The Cabinet Manual and the Codification of Conventions’, I draw a series of conclusions about the
manual and its implications.
A process currently underway in the UK has important implications for the way we are governed, raising difficult
questions about the democratic legitimacy of the system itself. The Cabinet Manual, first published in October
2011, exemplifies this tendency.
The setting out in writing of constitutional conventions is a complex task, since they can be difficult to define with
precision. A text such as the manual is likely, in the process of encapsulating these understandings, to alter them.
It may encourage the adoption of particular views of what they are. Codification can also place a brake on the
development of constitutional conventions over time, through freezing them in a particular form. It may also
indirectly undermine the force of those rules which are not chosen for inclusion in an official document, since they
may be overlooked or judged relatively less important than those that are referred to in a code. The manual
seems in some cases to have contributed to the creation of conventions that did not previously exist. However, the
invention of conventions can only take place if there is at least tacit consent from the different relevant players.
It is best to view the manual and other codes like it as coming within a category known as ‘soft law’: a means of
inducing particular kinds of conduct and advancing specific versions of what is appropriate behaviour, but not
directly enforceable by the courts. The ability to issue texts such as the Cabinet Manual does not provide
unrestrained potential to determine conventions, but it does supply some influence in shaping their existence.
While it is not the same as ‘hard’ legislation, the process of codification that the manual represents may enhance
the chances of constitutional conventions playing a part in judicial review, perhaps in a consideration of the
appropriateness of the actions of ministers. In this sense, the principles of the unwritten UK constitution might
acquire a more formal status than previously through their inclusion in the manual or a similar text.
This judicial development is at present, speculative. Nonetheless, codification already carries with it the potential
for significant impact on the perceptions and in the turn realities of how we are governed. This tendency raises
difficulties because one player – namely the executive – was preeminent in the creation of the Cabinet Manual,
producing drafts and making the final decisions about the full first edition (though a public consultation took place).
A practice with important constitutional implications should surely be more inclusive than it was in the case of the
manual.
However, there are limits to how aggressively the executive could utilise its power to issue documents like the
manual without producing a negative reaction that hindered the government in achieving its objectives.
Nonetheless, it is advisable to give attention to possible changes in the way conventions are codified. One issue
meriting attention is whether some kind of system of parliamentary assent for a text is advisable. Perhaps
Parliament or its committees could issue codes of its own; and more meaningful forms of engagement in
production processes are needed. Yet however it is managed in future, the powerful drive to introduce greater
clarity into constitutional conventions is manifest. Whether it might lead on in time to a full written constitution
remains to be seen.
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